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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), to establish a comprehensive regulation of insurance coverage in
the national health care market. Plaintiffs here assert that one section of the Act, the
minimum coverage provision codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, was enacted in excess of the
enumerated powers accorded to Congress under Article I. Plaintiffs’ claim fails, as the
provision falls well within the Congressional commerce power, as well as the Congressional
taxing power. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should accordingly be granted,
and plaintiffs’ motion should be denied. Defendants respectfully request the opportunity to
present argument in support of their motion for summary judgment.
As is well known, Congress has the power to enact regulations that address matters
with substantial effects on interstate commerce. Congress not only had a rational basis, but
an ample legislative record, to conclude that the use of health care services by the uninsured
population imposes substantial effects on interstate commerce. Participation in the national
health care market is nearly universal, among the insured and the uninsured alike. When
persons without insurance coverage use health care services, they cannot and do not pay the
full cost of those services. The cost of that uncompensated care—at least $43 billion in 2008
alone—is instead paid by providers, by governments, by insurers, and, ultimately by the
insured population in the form of higher premiums. Congress plainly has the authority under
its commerce power to address these burdens imposed on the national health care market.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this result by characterizing their behavior as “inactivity.”
But plaintiffs, by their own admission, are active participants in the health care market;
similarly, the overwhelming majority of the uninsured population actively uses health care
1
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services—that is, they actively engage in the economic transaction of purchasing medical
services, even if others pay the bill for those purchases. Plaintiffs’ “inactivity” theory
depends on their insistence that Congress was required to define the relevant market in the
way that they prefer, to include only health insurance, and that Congress was required to
ignore the larger market for health care services—a market in which plaintiffs admittedly are
active participants. No rule of law requires Congress to define the subject of its regulation in
this artificial manner; Congress instead may address economic reality, in which insurance
coverage is not a stand-alone product, but is the principal means of payment in the market for
health care services.
Plaintiffs further argue that, even if Congress may address cost-shifting generally, that
regulation may not extend to them, because they do not expect to shift the costs of their own
health care expenditures. But even if plaintiffs do not shift the costs of their health care,
millions of other people who are not insured will. Congress is entitled to focus on that
aggregate effect. Moreover, plaintiffs ignore the reality of the health care marketplace.
Nobody can know with certainty the timing or extent of their health care needs, and even
healthy individuals may find themselves suddenly in need of expensive care. Because no
person—not even these plaintiffs—can know for sure that he will not find himself in that
situation, it is not surprising that the uninsured population pays for less than half of the cost
of their health care expenses, or that this result holds true for those with higher incomes and
for those with lower incomes alike.
The minimum coverage provision also falls well within Congress’s commerce power
because it forms an integral part of the Act’s regulatory scheme. Among other reforms, the
Act regulates the terms and conditions of health insurance policies offered in interstate
2
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commerce. It has long been established that Congress has such power. In particular, the Act
requires “guaranteed issue,” that is, it requires insurers to guarantee coverage to all
applicants without regard to their medical condition or history, and “community rating,” that
is, it bars insurers from discriminating in the pricing of premiums on the basis of those
factors. Congress found these reforms to be necessary because millions of Americans, even
those with relatively minor pre-existing conditions, have found themselves unable to
purchase individual coverage due to industry practices that screen or price these persons out.
And Congress found it essential to couple these reforms with the minimum coverage
provision, as otherwise its reforms would set in motion a spiral of increasing premiums and
decreased coverage, because individuals could wait to purchase insurance until they were ill
or injured, knowing that insurers would be required to cover them at no greater cost. This
link also establishes the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, as Congress has the
authority to adopt means that it finds necessary to implement its enumerated powers.
Plaintiffs do not dispute this link, but they argue that Section 5000A must
nevertheless be struck down, as otherwise Congress would have an incentive to “legislate
broadly,” or to adopt measures with known “negative consequences” so as to justify
additional action to rectify those consequences. This is not the law; Congress has always had
the power to adopt integrated regulatory schemes, and it has the power to consider whether
the pursuit of one policy might have side effects that require adjustment through a second
policy. Plaintiffs’ claim, ultimately, is that it was not worth it, as a policy matter, to protect
the millions of Americans with pre-existing conditions if those reforms required the
minimum coverage provision as well. But that is a policy question, and it is reserved for
Congress, not for plaintiffs or for this Court.
3
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Plaintiffs further assert that Congress has claimed a limitless “police power” which
must be invalidated to avoid the result that Congress can regulate anything. Congress, of
course, regulates only pursuant to its enumerated powers, but there is no need to speculate
here as to the limits of those enumerated powers, or which side of the dividing line the
minimum coverage provision falls on. Congress may not regulate a wholly non-economic
subject matter, where the link of that subject matter to interstate commerce depends on an
attenuated chain of inferences, and where that subject matter is not an integral part of a larger
regulation of commerce. But no chain of inferences is required here to link Section 5000A to
interstate commerce; that provision directly regulates an economic subject, the means of
payments for the commercial transaction of purchasing health care services. And, as noted,
the provision is an integral part of the Act’s larger regulation of the interstate market.
The minimum coverage provision is also well justified under the Article I taxing
power. Section 5000A has the practical operation of a tax; it applies only to those who are
required to file federal income tax returns, any penalty is reported on that return, and it is
calculated in accordance with household income, as that term is defined for federal tax
purposes. The provision also indisputably raises revenue for the general treasury. It is,
without question, an exercise of the taxing power in addition to the commerce power.
As the minimum coverage provision falls well within Congress’s Article I powers,
there is no need to consider plaintiffs’ claim that the entirety of the Affordable Care Act
stands or falls with that provision. Plaintiffs, in any event, lack standing to address the
severability question, as they identify no provision of the Act apart from Section 5000A that
burdens them in any way. If the issue were to be reached, however, the vast majority of the
Act would remain legally operative in the absence of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, and it is not
4
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evident that Congress intended the entirety of its statute to stand or fall with that provision.
Apart from the Act’s “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms, which do depend
on the minimum coverage provision (thereby, as discussed, proving that provision’s
constitutionality), this Court should not take the extraordinary step of invalidating the entire
statute based on plaintiffs’ speculation as to Congress’s intent.
In sum, there is vigorous public debate regarding Congress’s policy choices when it
enacted the Affordable Care Act. But the Constitution assigns those policy choices to the
legislature, not to the courts. In enacting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, Congress sought to address the
significant issue of cost-shifting within the national health care market, and to ensure the
effectiveness of the protections that it created for the millions of Americans with pre-existing
conditions. Article I of the Constitution affords Congress the power to do so.
ARGUMENT
I.

CONGRESS ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS IN
ADOPTING THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION
Plaintiffs claim that Congress exceeded its Article I powers in enacting the minimum

coverage provision, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. To prevail on this claim, they must make a “‘plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.’” United States v. Ostrander,
411 F.3d 684, 694 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607
(2000)). They cannot meet this heavy burden, as the provision is well within Congressional
authority. First, Congress acted well within its authority to adopt measures that are necessary
and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce when it enacted 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. The
minimum coverage provision addresses activity with substantial effects on interstate
commerce, namely, the use of health care services by the uninsured population—a practice
5
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that shifts at least $43 billion in costs annually to other participants in the national health care
market. Further, Congress reasonably found the provision to be necessary to ensure the
effectiveness of its larger regulation of the interstate insurance industry. It is well established
that the commerce power permits Congress to enact regulations that it determines are integral
to a larger regulation of interstate markets. Second, the minimum coverage provision raises
revenue and operates as a tax, and is a valid exercise of Congress’s independent taxing
authority under the General Welfare Clause.
A.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Regulates Conduct with Substantial
Effects on Interstate Commerce
1.

The Use of Health Care Services by the Uninsured Population
Imposes Significant Burdens on Other Participants in the National
Health Care Market

The minimum coverage provision falls well within Congress’s commerce power, as it
regulates conduct with substantial effects on interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause
affords Congress broad authority to “regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005). This includes power not only to
regulate markets directly, but also to regulate even non-commercial matters that have clear
and direct economic effects on interstate commerce. See United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d
522, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2010).

The determinative question is whether Congress could

rationally find that the conduct it seeks to regulate has, in the aggregate, a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 127-28 (1942).
These holdings settle the question of the minimum coverage provision’s
constitutionality. Although the “unique nature of the market for health care and the breadth
6
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of the Act present a novel set of facts for consideration,” the law governing Congressional
authority is not at all novel; rather, “the well-settled principles expounded in Raich and
Wickard control the disposition of this claim.” Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, --- F. Supp. 2d ---,
2010 WL 4860299, at *14 (W.D. Va. 2010) (emphasis added).1
Defendants have explained many of the ways in which economic decisions regarding
how to pay for health care services substantially affect interstate commerce. See Defs.’
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 21-24 (ECF No. 70-1). Participation in the national
health care market is nearly universal. This is no less true of the uninsured population, which
participates in the health care market by receiving medical services.

Nationwide, the

uninsured consume over $100 billion of health care services annually. FAMILIES USA,
HIDDEN HEALTH TAX: AMERICANS PAY A PREMIUM 2 (2009) ($116 billion in 2008) (Ex. 24
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment).

The average person without health

insurance coverage for a full year, however, pays for only about one-third of the cost of his
medical expenditures. Jack Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs,
Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs 2008, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS w399, w401 (2008)
(Defs.’ Ex. 28). The remaining costs are shifted on to other participants in the health care
market; that cost shifting amounted to at least $43 billion in 2008.

42 U.S.C.

§ 18091(a)(2)(F). These costs are paid in part by public funds; the remainder falls in the first
instance on health care providers, who in turn “pass on the cost to private insurers, which
pass on the cost to families.” Id.
1

The contrary holding of the district court in Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011), cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Raich and Wickard. Its decision rests instead on its conclusions that Raich was both
“surprising[]” and wrongly decided, id. at *19-20, and that the holding of Wickard (which was
specifically reaffirmed in Raich) was “ridiculous,” id. at *24 n.20.
7
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The substantial effects that the uninsured population imposes on the rest of the health
care market are thus well documented. These effects resolve the matter, because Congress
may regulate activity that, in the aggregate, imposes such substantial burdens on an interstate
market. See, e.g., United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).2
Plaintiffs attempt to dispute Congress’s findings on this score, but they can do so only by
pretending that the factual record before Congress did not exist, and by ignoring that this
Court reviews that record only for a rational basis.3 Plaintiffs, inexplicably, contend that the
minimum coverage provision fails the “substantial effects” test because the focus must be on
“whether the activity has a substantial effect on the market to be regulated before the law in
question is effectuated.” Pls.’ Mem. in Supp of Mot. for Summ. J. at 11 (ECF No. 69-1)
(emphasis in original). This is a non sequitur. The uninsured already shift their costs on to
unwilling recipients. The economic effects of this practice are not hypothetical, but have
been proven to exist in the present day. Congress is not powerless to address this economic
practice.
2

Faasse upheld the Congressional power to regulate the failure to make child support
payments. Plaintiffs attempt to reconcile this case with their “inactivity” theory by asserting that
the defendant’s failure to make a payment was “an act.” Pls.’ Mem. at 38. The distinction that
plaintiffs wish to draw between an “active” failure to pay in that case and the supposedly
“passive” failure by the uninsured population to make full payment for their health care
expenditures is not readily apparent.
3

Plaintiffs also ignore that this Court reviews Congress’s exercise of its Article I powers
only for a rational basis, and thus attempt to dispute the wisdom of Congress’s policy judgments.
In doing so, they misread their cited material. For example, they believe that Medicare’s actuary
found that the ACA will increase the rate of growth in national health care expenditures. He
instead found that the Act, as enacted, would result in “noticeable downward effects” in those
expenditures. Pls.’ Ex. 4, at 17-18. And contrary to plaintiffs’ citation to newspaper articles
claiming low rates of insurance after Massachusetts enacted reforms similar to the ACA, the
actual record shows that 98.1% of residents of that state are now insured, Mass. Div. of Health
Care Fin. & Policy, Health Insurance Coverage in Massachusetts, at 1 (Dec. 2010), with
premiums dropping substantially in that state, see Defs.’ Ex. 37.
8
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Plaintiffs’ reasoning is echoed in the recent decision of the court in Florida v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011),
which without explanation concluded that the uninsured population has an effect on
commerce amounting to “zero.” Id. at *26. But the uninsured do use health care services,
and they shift not “zero,” but at least $43 billion annually, in the cost of their medical care to
other market participants.

Congress rationally found this to be the case, 42 U.S.C.

§ 18091(a)(2)(F), and neither plaintiffs nor the court in Florida can cite to any evidence that
could even cast doubt on this finding, let alone that would show the finding to be lacking
even a rational basis. The “market reality” instead is that “[h]ow participants in the health
care services market pay for such services has a documented impact on interstate
commerce”; the law is clear that Congress may address those documented impacts under its
commerce power, whether or not plaintiffs might speculate without any basis that those
effects are actually zero. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894
(E.D. Mich. 2010);4 see also Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15.
Building on the misconception that the uninsured population imposes “zero” in costs
on the rest of the health care market, the court in Florida surmised that Section 5000A is
unconstitutional because it targets “inactivity” by applying to “everyone in the present,”
rather than applying to individuals in the future when they seek care. Florida, 2011 WL
285683, at *26 (emphasis in original). In that court’s view, Congress could impose an
insurance requirement only at the point in time that uninsured persons seek medical care,

4

The plaintiffs’ appeal in Thomas More is pending before the Sixth Circuit, and the
parties have completed briefing. The court has granted the appellants’ unopposed motion to
expedite oral argument in that appeal, and will hear argument during the court’s session of May
30 through June 10, 2011.
9
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even though there is no dispute that the use of health care services is essentially universal.
Id.5 The implications of this point of view are far-reaching. No humane society could
impose barriers, like an insurance requirement, at the door of the hospital. The health care
market is unique, in part, because there is a widespread expectation that services in that
market will be provided as a matter of right, without first inquiring into the patient’s ability
to pay. This expectation is reflected in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act, 42 U.S.C § 1395dd, which guarantees access to emergency room services in hospitals
that accept Medicare, even for those who cannot pay. The alternative form of regulation that
the court in Florida proposed cannot be squared with this national commitment to provide a
minimum level of care to all. Moreover, that court’s proposed alternative would practically
fail, as no health insurance market could survive “if people could buy their insurance on the
way to the hospital.” 47 Million and Counting: Why the Health Care Marketplace Is
Broken: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 52 (2008) (statement of Prof.
Hall) (Defs.’ Ex. 19.) The problem of the cost-shifting of uncompensated care can be
addressed only through ensuring that people have insurance in advance of their trip to the
hospital.

Congress, at least, could rationally tailor its policy in this manner.

The

Constitution does not dictate the policy that the court in Florida suggested.

5

The activity regulated under Section 5000A and under Florida’s proposed alternative is
the same: the use of health care services in the absence of insurance. That court differed from
Congress only in the choice of means to address that underlying problem. But once an activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, bringing it within Congress’s commerce power to
address, that choice of means is “‘for congressional determination alone.’” United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 54748 (1934)).
10
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2.

Plaintiffs May Not Avoid Congressional
Characterizing Themselves as “Inactive”

Regulation

by

As described above, the minimum coverage provision falls well within the commerce
power, given the substantial effects that the uninsured population imposes on the rest of the
interstate health care market through the use of health care services for which others must
pay. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this result by asserting that they, and other uninsured
persons, are engaged only in “inactivity,” Pls.’ Mem. at 1, or that “the Plaintiffs are doing
nothing,” id. at 38. This is plainly false. Plaintiffs themselves concede that they actively
participate in the health care market.

Thompson Aff. ¶ 9; Grapek Aff. ¶ 6.

And, as

mentioned above, the empirical evidence shows that the uninsured population, as a class,
regularly uses health care services, and in so doing shifts billions of dollars each year in the
costs of their care to other market participants. These costs do not appear out of thin air.
They instead arise from individual conduct by the uninsured that in the aggregate has
enormous economic consequences—the economic activity of obtaining health care services
for which the uninsured do not, and cannot, fully pay.

The conduct of the uninsured

population—their active use of the health care system, their economic decisions as to how to
finance that use, their migration in and out of insurance coverage, and their shifting of costs
on to the rest of the system when they cannot pay—plainly is economic activity. Indeed, the
uninsured are even more directly engaged in economic activity than the plaintiffs in Raich,
who consumed only home-grown marijuana and had no intent to enter the marijuana market.
Plaintiffs’ contrary argument turns on their attempt to focus the Court’s attention only
on their lack of participation in the “market for health insurance.” E.g., Pls.’ Mem. at 11.
Plaintiffs repeatedly claim to be inactive in the submarket for health insurance, see id. at 4, 5,
11
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11, 22, 25, 26, 32, but they studiously avoid discussing their activity in the overall market for
health care. There is no requirement that Congress focus its attention on a market as the
plaintiffs define it. Instead, Congress is entitled to take the broader view, and to recognize
the fundamental nature of health insurance, which is not a stand-alone good but instead
serves as the principal means of payment for health care services in the United States.
Because participation in the health care market is universal, but no person can accurately
predict the timing or the extent of their need to make health care expenditures, the decision
whether to carry insurance or to attempt to pay for one’s inevitable use of health care
services through other means is “plainly economic.” Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
Plaintiffs may prefer to attempt to finance their health care expenditures out-of-pocket, but
that preference “is much like the preference of the plaintiff farmer in Wickard for fulfilling
his demand for wheat by growing his own rather than by purchasing it.” Liberty Univ., 2010
WL 4860299, at *15.
Plaintiffs’ participation, or lack thereof, in health insurance coverage thus cannot be
divorced from their undoubted participation in the health care market. An interstate trucker
without insurance, to take only one example, may be “active” in the interstate trucking
market, but “inactive” in the interstate trucking insurance submarket, under plaintiffs’
reasoning. Yet it is entirely uncontroversial that Congress can require these persons to carry
insurance, in order to prevent unwarranted cost-shifting. 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1). The same
analysis holds here. Whether or not the uninsured population could plausibly be described as
“inactive” with respect to insurance coverage (and even this is doubtful, as the majority of
those without coverage at any given point in time in fact are migrating in and out of
coverage, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (“CBO”), HOW MANY PEOPLE LACK
12
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HEALTH INSURANCE AND FOR HOW LONG? at 4, 9 (2003) (Defs.’ Ex. 14)), they are
indisputably “active” with respect to the overall market for health care services, of which
insurance coverage plays a part.
3.

Plaintiffs May Not Avoid Congressional Regulation by Redefining
the Class that Congress Sought to Regulate

Plaintiffs also contend that the minimum coverage provision cannot constitutionally
be applied to them, or to other persons with incomes of more than 400% of the federal
poverty level, because “they presently pay out-of-pocket for health care and will pay out of
pocket for all future health care costs, including catastrophic ones.” Pls.’ Mem. at 39.6 They
argue that Congress did not make a specific finding that uninsured persons with higher
incomes shift their health care costs on to the rest of the system. Id. But the courts “have
never required Congress to make particularized findings in order to legislate” under its
Article I powers, let alone findings at the level of specificity that plaintiffs here demand.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 21; see also id. at 21 n.32. Instead, where “Congress decides that the
‘total incidence’ of a practice” — here, the practice of consuming health care without
insurance — “poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.” Id. at 17
(quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-155 (1971)).
6

In prior briefing, plaintiffs attempted to support this implausible assertion by claiming
that the uninsured frequently “contract with private hospitals to pay for catastrophic care out of
pocket on agreeable terms.” Pls.’ Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 24. It is not clear how
plaintiffs envision that an uninsured patient could negotiate rates at the emergency room door
before being admitted for surgery. This negotiation is in any event forbidden under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, which requires
hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize any patient who
arrives with an emergency condition, regardless of ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ assertion that such
negotiations are both possible and common turns on their misreading of their cited material; the
term “fee-for-service” refers to a method of payment by insurers to medical providers. CBO,
KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS 102 (Dec. 2008) (Defs.’ Ex.
9.)
13
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In any event, plaintiffs’ premise—that only the lower-income portion of the uninsured
population shifts their costs—is wrong. Even higher-income persons without insurance pay
on average less than half of the full cost of their medical care, and they thereby obligate other
market participants to pay for the care that they receive. See Bradley Herring, The Effect of
the Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the Demand for Private Health
Insurance, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 225, 230 (2005) (Defs.’ Ex. 11.) This is not surprising.
Cancer, to take only one example, will not strike a relatively affluent person with any more
warning than it will a poor person. Without insurance, few people could entirely absorb, for
example, the $150,000 or more it costs for drug treatment alone for a common form of
cancer. See Neal J. Meropol et al., Cost of Cancer Care: Issues and Implications, 25 J.
CLIN. ONCOL. 180, 182 (2007) (Defs.’ Ex. 8).
Congress, then, had far more than a rational basis not to excise plaintiffs out of the
class that it regulated. The uninsured, including those with higher incomes, shift the costs of
their medical care on to other market participants. And persons with both high and low
incomes would have an incentive to game the system and to undermine the Act’s
“guaranteed-issue” and “community-rating” reforms in the absence of the minimum
coverage provision. But, as noted, even apart from these obvious bases for Congress’s
policy judgment, Congress is not required to individualize a regulation of nationwide
applicability.

Because the “‘general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to

commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558
(1995)); see also Bowers, 594 F.3d at 524.

14
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B.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is an Integral Part of the Larger
Regulatory Scheme, and Is Necessary and Proper to Congress’s
Regulation of Interstate Commerce
1.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Rational Means to
Implement Congressional Authority to Regulate the Terms and
Conditions of Insurance Policies Sold in Interstate Commerce

Congress enacted the ACA to address a national crisis—an interstate health care
market constituting more than one-sixth of the American economy, in which tens of millions
of Americans went without insurance coverage and in which the costs of treatment spiraled
out of control. As part of a comprehensive reform effort seeking, among other things, to
reduce the ranks of the uninsured, the ACA regulates quintessentially economic decisions
regarding the means of payment for health care services. In particular, the ACA reforms
insurance industry practices; it prevents insurers from denying or revoking coverage for
those with pre-existing conditions, and it prevents insurers from charging discriminatory
rates because of those conditions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a). These
“guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms directly regulate the interstate health
insurance market, and without question fall within Congress’s authority to regulate that
market under its commerce power. See United States v. S-E Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
533, 552-53 (1944). These are reasonable measures to protect millions of Americans from
practices that would prevent them from obtaining or retaining insurance in the event of
unexpected, and possibly catastrophic, illness or injury.
Congress also found the minimum coverage provision to be necessary to effectuate
this regulation of the insurance industry. If the bar on denying coverage or charging more to
people because of pre-existing conditions were not coupled with a minimum coverage
provision, individuals would have powerful incentives to wait until they fall ill before they
15
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buy health insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). Without that provision, the insurance
industry reforms would create a spiral of rising premiums and a declining number of
individuals covered. See Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Uwe
Reinhardt, Ph.D.) (Defs.’ Ex. 20). The minimum coverage provision thus is “‘an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated,’” and is well within the commerce
power. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also United States v.
Rose, 522 F.3d 710, 717 (6th Cir. 2008); Faasse, 265 F.3d at 482.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that these insurance industry reforms are within the
commerce power. Nor do they dispute that the minimum coverage provision is necessary to
make these larger regulations of the interstate market effective. These concessions establish
that Congress acted within its commerce power. See Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894
(recognizing that the minimum coverage provision “operates as an essential part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme” and thus is valid under Raich). Indeed, if Congress has
authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce—as it plainly does with respect to its
regulation of health insurance policies in the interstate market—“it possesses every power
needed to make that regulation effective.” United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110, 118-19 (1942). “‘If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain
the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the
closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are
matters for congressional determination alone.’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934)).
16
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Absent a violation of some independent constitutional prohibition, “the relevant
inquiry is simply ‘whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a
legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to implement.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting Raich, 545
U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600, 605 (2004). The Act’s “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms of the
insurance market are, unquestionably, exercises of the commerce power. The minimum
coverage provision is not only rationally related, but indeed is “essential,” to the
implementation of these reforms. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). And, as this Court has already
held, there is no plausible claim that the minimum coverage provision violates the Due
Process Clause or any other independent constitutional prohibition. That is the end of the
matter.
Plaintiffs argue that Congress may not rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause as an
“independent basis for legislation,” and that Congress may not “take any action conceivable
in reliance solely on its self-serving notion of what is necessary and proper without regard to
the Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers.”
defendants’ claim.

Pls.’ Mem. at 45-46.

But that is not

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress acted within its enumerated

commerce power in regulating the terms of insurance policies sold in the interstate market
(indeed, they carefully avoid discussing this point). Nor do they dispute that Congress
rationally found the minimum coverage provision to be necessary for those regulations to
work. That provision is thus plainly a valid exercise of Congress’s power to adopt measures
necessary and proper to implement its regulation of commerce.

17
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2.

Plaintiffs’ Attempt to Dispute Congress’s Implementation Power Is
Foreclosed by Supreme Court Precedent

Plaintiffs argue that Congress may not undertake one regulation of economic activity
(here, the insurance industry reforms protecting between 50 million and 129 million nonelderly Americans whose pre-existing medical conditions threaten their insurance coverage),
and then use its implementation authority to adjust the effects of that regulation (here, the
minimum coverage provision). Pls.’ Mem. at 42. The district court in Florida reasoned
similarly, holding that Congress may not enact provisions that are “‘necessary’ to avoid the
negative consequences that will potentially flow from its own statutory enactments.” 2011
WL 285683, at *33 (emphasis in original). This is a newly-invented rule, without support in
any holding of the Supreme Court—ever—to defendants’ knowledge.

It is entirely

uncontroversial that Congress may address “negative consequences” that arise as a result of
its own statutes.

When Congress exercised its power to create the postal system, for

example, it became necessary to enact laws to deal with a side effect—that some people
would seek to steal the mail.

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 417 (1819).

Similarly, the authority of Congress under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal
moneys carries with it “corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause” to
deal with a nearly inevitable negative consequence of any such statute—the possibility that
the funds will be “frittered away in graft.” Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605. And the Congressional
authority to operate federal prisons creates the “negative consequence” that some prisoners
will be mentally ill and sexually dangerous at the end of their prison term; Congress may
address that consequence through the use of a civil-commitment scheme. Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. at 1961-62 (noting that harm from release of dangerous inmates from federal custody was
18
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a harm in part created by Congress itself). Any Congressional legislation—particularly
legislation adjusting economic rights and responsibilities—will inevitably have side effects.
Congress plainly may still enact such legislation, and it also has the power to take action to
adjust those effects as it deems necessary to carry out its overall legislative purpose.
Given the absence of any case law for this theory, plaintiffs rely on the dissenting
opinion in Raich, which reasoned that a rule allowing Congress to adopt integrated
regulatory schemes would give Congress a “perverse incentive to legislate broadly.” Raich,
545 U.S. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But this Court follows majority opinions, not
dissents, and the majority in Raich directly refuted the dissent’s reasoning. The Court stated
its doubt that Congress would ever legislate pretextually simply for the purpose of reaching
matters otherwise beyond its commerce power. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 n.34. The Court found
it unnecessary to address the matter further, as “there is no suggestion that the [statute at
issue] constitutes the type of ‘evasive’ legislation the dissent fears.” Id. So too here. There
is absolutely no reason to believe that Congress adopted its insurance industry reforms as a
pretext to justify the minimum coverage provision.
At bottom, plaintiffs’ reasoning, like that of the district court in Florida, rests on the
premise that Congress enacted the Act’s supposedly “dysfunctional” (Florida, 2011 WL
285683, at *31) insurance-industry reforms as a mere feint to justify its enactment of Section
5000A as well. This notion cannot plausibly be sustained. Congress adopted these reforms
to address a market failure. In the absence of the Act’s guaranteed-issue and communityrating reforms, individual and small-group insurers would necessarily have continued their
practice of “medical underwriting,” which screens or prices out applicants with medical
conditions or histories that indicate a higher-than-average need for medical care.
19
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Without the guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms of the Affordable Care
Act, people who attempt to purchase individual health insurance coverage would continue to
face significant obstacles to obtaining coverage. Insurers scrutinize the medical condition
and history of each applicant to determine their eligibility and premiums in a process known
as “medical underwriting.” See KEY ISSUES, supra, at 8, 80 (Defs.’ Ex. 9.). An estimated
12.6 million non-elderly adults — 36% of those who tried to purchase health insurance in the
previous three years from an insurance company in the individual insurance market — have
been denied coverage, charged a higher rate, or offered limited coverage because of a preexisting condition. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., COVERAGE DENIED: HOW THE
CURRENT HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM LEAVES MILLIONS BEHIND 1 (2009) (Defs.’ Ex. 23.).
And more than 57 million non-elderly Americans have some pre-existing medical condition,
and thus, absent the Affordable Care Act, would be at risk for a denial of insurance coverage
in the individual market. FAMILIES USA, HEALTH REFORM: HELP FOR AMERICANS WITH
PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS, at 2 (2010) (Defs.’ Ex. 22). Overall, the administrative costs
that arise from medical underwriting represent 26-30% of the cost of premiums for
individual and small group policies. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(J). Given the cost of these
policies and restrictions on coverage, it is accordingly unsurprising that only 20% of
Americans who lack other coverage options purchase a policy in the individual market, or
that the remaining 80% are uninsured. KEY ISSUES, supra, at 9.
It is, then, utterly implausible that Congress enacted its insurance industry reforms as
a mere pretext, rather than as a solution to the problem of denial of coverage for those with
pre-existing conditions. Plaintiffs’ claim that Congress acted on a “perverse incentive” to
legislate broadly, or the court in Florida’s claim that Congress acted simply to create
20
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“negative consequences” so as to justify further regulation, at bottom reflects no more than
their disagreement with Congress’s policy decision that the denial of coverage for those with
pre-existing conditions was a problem worth addressing. But that policy decision is reserved
for Congress, not the courts. Congress rationally determined that the policy balance weighed
in favor of a measure that would give millions of Americans the ability to purchase coverage
without regard to their medical history, in order to ensure that coverage is available when
these persons find that they need it the most. Once Congress made that policy choice, the
majority opinion in Raich—which this Court is obligated to follow, rather than the reasoning
of the dissent in that case—makes it absolutely clear that Congress could use its
implementation authority to adopt the minimum coverage provision to ensure the
effectiveness of the insurance industry reforms.
3.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not Represent a Claim of
a Limitless National Police Power

Plaintiffs further argue that 26 U.S.C. § 5000A must be invalid, because no principled
line can be drawn between that provision and a limitless Congressional “police power.” Pls.’
Mem. at 21-22. But there is no need to speculate here as to the limits of Congress’s
commerce power. Those limits are set forth in Supreme Court precedent, and the minimum
coverage provision falls well within them. In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court
recognized that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to regulate a purely noneconomic subject matter, if that subject matter bears no more than an “attenuated”
connection to interstate commerce, and if the regulation does not form part of a broader
scheme of economic regulation. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567
(Congress may not “pile inference upon inference” to find a link between the regulated
21
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activity and interstate commerce).
In contrast to those cases, “[n]o piling is needed here to show that Congress was
within its prerogative” to regulate interstate commerce. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608. The ACA
does not depend on “attenuated” links between its subject matter and interstate commerce;
the subject matter of the Act is itself quintessentially economic, the means of payment for
economic transactions, that is, the purchase of health care services. The district court in
Florida analogized this case to Lopez and Morrison, accusing Congress of “piling ‘inference
upon inference’” to conclude that “the uninsured” have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 2011 WL 285683, at *26. But no inferences are required to conclude that the
uninsured do receive $43 billion in uncompensated care per year. That is not an attenuated
inference, but a hard fact, found by Congress, and undisputed by plaintiffs. The court in
Florida thus erred in analogizing this case to the “inferential” leaps that are necessary to
support the conclusion that gender-motivated violence or carrying guns near schools has
downstream economic impacts. Id. This case is quite different: The starting point for the
inferential leaps in both Lopez and Morrison involved “noneconomic, criminal” conduct, and
the nature of the conduct at issue was “central” to the Court’s decisions in those cases.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; see also Sabri, 541 U.S. at 607 (noting that Lopez and Morrison
“emphasized the noneconomic nature of the regulated conduct”).
Unlike the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the minimum coverage provision
directly regulates a quintessentially economic subject matter, the financing of payments in
the unique health care market. That market is unlike any other market, in part because “[n]o
one can guarantee his or her health, or ensure that he or she will never participate in the
health care market.” Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894. Virtually every American is a
22
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participant in the health care market, as it is inevitable that health care expenses will be
incurred. The minimum coverage provision, then, does not create commerce in order to
regulate it, as plaintiffs apparently assume when they describe Congress’s claimed power as
“limitless.” Pls.’ Mem. at 32. Instead, Congress recognized that commercial transactions
already occur, and that substantial effects on interstate commerce arise when some
commercial actors are required to cover the costs of health care transactions that the
uninsured enter into, but cannot pay for. Congress can take steps to ensure that the uninsured
contribute their share of the bill, without in any sense broaching the limits on its ability to
address purely non-economic matters established under Lopez and Morrison.
The court in Florida did not deal with the reasoning of Lopez and Morrison, and
instead depicted Section 5000A as a claim of limitless power, because in its view the
provision could be analogized to other hypothetical requirements to act, such as a supposed
requirement to buy a house backed by a mortgage.7 But Section 5000A is in no sense
analogous to a requirement to buy a house; it does not require individuals to buy a standalone product, but instead regulates the way that individuals will pay for health care
expenditures that they inevitably will incur. Moreover, individuals do not develop sudden,
unforeseen needs to buy exorbitantly expensive new houses. Nor is it the case that, if such a
need arises, an individual is automatically entitled to a house regardless of his ability to pay.
In the real estate market, as in virtually any market outside of the context of health care, an
7

This form of slippery-slope reasoning echoes that of the plaintiff in Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937), which upheld the Social Security Act’s provision of retirement benefits for
those over 65 years of age. That plaintiff argued that, if Congress had the power to so provide,
nothing would stop it from establishing the age of 30 as the retirement age. Brief for the
Appellant, Helvering v. Davis (1937), 1937 WL 40760, at *53-*54. Sometimes slopes are not all
that slippery, particularly those that depend upon the premise that Congress will enact entirely
irrational legislation.
23
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individual’s ability to obtain a product is almost solely dependent upon that individual’s
ability to pay. But virtually everyone is a participant in the health care market, and access to
that market in a time of need is guaranteed both by federal and state laws and by the dictates
of an ethical society. And it is a documented fact that third parties bear the burden of the
cost of the uninsured population’s participation in that market. The court in Florida’s parade
of horribles, then, depends entirely upon a disregard of the specific features of the health care
market that made Section 5000A necessary.
C.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s
Independent Power Under the General Welfare Clause

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the minimum coverage provision fails for a third reason.
Congress also validly enacted the provision as an exercise of its taxing and spending power
under the General Welfare Clause of Article I. The test of whether a provision is an exercise
of the taxing authority does not turn on the labels that Congress chose, but instead on the
“practical operation” of the provision. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363
(1941); see also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (funds owed by operation
of Internal Revenue Code had “essential character as taxes” despite statutory label as
“penalties”). And the minimum coverage provision plainly operates as a tax, that is, as a
“pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the
government.” United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1942). Only individuals
who are required to file federal income tax returns for a given year can be subject to the
penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2). If the penalty applies, it is calculated by reference to the
taxpayer’s household income. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1), (2). The taxpayer must report any
penalty on his return for the tax year, as an addition to his income tax liability. 26 U.S.C.
24
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§ 5000A(b)(2).

The Congressional Budget Office found that Section 5000A will raise

substantial revenues for the general treasury, see Defs.’ Ex. 40 at tbl. 4, and Congress
expressly adopted the CBO’s conclusions in finding that the ACA would have a deficitreducing effect. ACA, § 1563(a)(1), (2), 124 Stat. 119, 270.
Despite the practical operation of Section 5000A as a tax, the district court in Florida
rejected the application of the taxing power, finding it “inarguably clear” that Congress did
not intend to exercise that power. Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp.
2d 720, 733 (N.D. Fla. 2010). That court rested on Congress’s inclusion of Commerce
Clause findings when it enacted Section 5000A. But Congress plainly may act under more
than one of its grants of authority, see, e.g., Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d
833, 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equal Pay Act is exercise of Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority, even given Commerce Clause findings); In re Leckie Smokeless Coal
Co., 99 F.3d 573, 586 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding “premiums” on coal operators to be exercise
of taxing power despite Commerce Clause findings and absence of taxing power findings).
The court in Florida also rested on what it misperceived to be Congress’s disavowal of the
taxing power as a basis of authority for the minimum coverage provision, but congressional
leaders repeatedly defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power during the floor
debates. See Defs.’ Mem. at 42. The minimum coverage provision operates like a tax. It is
codified in the Internal Revenue Code; it is administered by the IRS; it is calculated based on
household income; it is reported on tax returns; and it is inapplicable to those who fall below
the filing threshold. Throughout the ACA, Congress used the taxing power to encourage
employers to offer, and individuals to purchase, insurance.

The minimum coverage

provision is no exception. It is plainly an exercise of the taxing power.
25
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Plaintiffs did not address the taxing power further in their motion for summary
judgment. It is not apparent why plaintiffs chose to waive any argument on this score. It is
possible, however, that plaintiffs interpreted this Court’s previous order to reach a holding on
the taxing power.

Defendants understand this Court to have ruled with respect to the

applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, but not yet to have ruled on the merits of the taxing
power claim. See Order of Nov. 22, 2010 at 8 (adopting Florida’s holding with respect to
the Anti-Injunction Act). See also Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *11 n.13 (rejecting
application of Anti-Injunction Act but reserving judgment on taxing power); Thomas More,
720 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (same).

The remaining issue in this case—whether Congress

exceeded its Article I powers—of course, requires a discussion of each of Congress’s Article
I authorities that applies here, including the taxing power. As plaintiffs have not discussed
the issue further, however, defendants will refer the Court to the discussion in their opening
brief. Defs.’ Mem. at 41-45.
II.

PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO SEEK THE INVALIDATION OF
PROVISIONS OTHER THAN THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION
Plaintiffs argue that if their challenge to 26 U.S.C. § 5000A succeeds, then the entire

ACA should be stricken as well. But plaintiffs have identified no harm that they suffer from
any provision other than Section 5000A. Even if plaintiffs were to prevail in their challenge
to that provision, their further challenge to the entire statute seeks nothing more than an
advisory opinion, which this Court should not provide in the absence of a party who could
claim standing to challenge the remainder of the Act. As in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997), the question of the severability of the ACA raises “important questions, but [the
Court has] no business answering them in [this case].” Id. at 935. The remainder of the
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statute grants rights and imposes obligations on third parties who have not participated in this
lawsuit.

Accordingly, like the Supreme Court in Printz, this Court should “decline to

speculate regarding the rights and obligations of parties not before the Court.” Id. Cf., e.g.,
New York, supra, at 186-187, 112 S.Ct., at 2434 (addressing severability where remaining
provisions at issue affected the plaintiffs).
Even if plaintiffs could somehow overcome their lack of standing to seek to overturn
the ACA in its entirety, the issue would still be premature in this briefing. The issue of
severability presents a number of complexities, which are best dealt with in separate briefing
in a remedies stage, instead of in response to a parting shot in plaintiffs’ summary judgment
brief. See Tanner Adver. Grp., LLC v. Fayette Cnty., 451 F.3d 777, 797 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006)
(Birch, J., concurring) (noting that issues of severability arise at remedies stage, not merits
stage).
In any event, if the issue were to be decided now, this Court should hold that the vast
majority of the ACA’s provisions are severable from Section 5000A. As the Supreme Court
recently emphasized, in a case that plaintiffs, curiously, fail to cite:
Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try
to limit the solution to the problem, severing any problematic portions while
leaving the remainder intact. Because the unconstitutionality of a part of an
Act does not necessarily defeat or affect the validity of its remaining
provisions, the normal rule is that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is
the required course.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010)
(internal quotations omitted; emphasis added). Courts therefore must “strive to salvage” as
much of a statute as possible, as only the statute, and not the court’s ruling, is a product of
the democratic process:

“[W]e try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is
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necessary, for we know that a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected
representatives of the people.” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320,
329 (2006) (internal quotation omitted).
Against the backdrop of this presumption in favor of severability, and in the absence
of a statutory provision expressly addressing severability, courts apply a two-part test. First,
after finding a portion of a statute unconstitutional, the court determines whether the
remaining portions remain “fully operative as a law”; if so, the remainder is “presumed
severable.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934 (1983). Second, that presumption can be
defeated if the court finds that it is “evident” that Congress would have preferred the rest of
the statute (or particular portions) to be invalidated along with the unconstitutional provision.
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161-62 (emphasis added).
Under these principles, a limited set of provisions of the Act cannot survive if 26
U.S.C. § 5000A is stricken. As defendants have emphasized, the Act’s guaranteed-issue and
community-rating insurance industry reforms will stand or fall with the minimum coverage
provision. As noted, these reforms protect the millions of Americans with pre-existing
medical conditions by requiring insurers to issue policies to those persons at nondiscriminatory rates.

As plaintiffs correctly recognize, see Pls.’ Mem. at 47-48, these

regulations of the interstate insurance market must be coupled with the minimum coverage
provision to be effective. Absent a minimum coverage provision, these insurance industry
reforms would create incentives for many to drop coverage, leading to a spiral of increased
premiums and a shrinking risk pool — the insurance market would “implode.” Because
Congress would not have intended this result, these reforms cannot be severed from the
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minimum coverage provision.8
The remaining parts of the statute, however, are plainly severable from the minimum
coverage provision. The Act, for example, ensures that gravely-ill children in hospice care
will not lose their right to receive Medicaid benefits for medical care.

42 U.S.C.

§ 1396d(o)(1)(C). The Act closes the “donut hole” in Medicare Part D prescription drug
coverage. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B). The Act also prevents discrimination against providers
who will not furnish assisted suicide services. Id. § 18113. It establishes an “Independence
at Home” demonstration project for chronically ill senior citizens. Id. § 1395cc-5. It
provides for a special Medicare enrollment period for disabled veterans. Id. § 1395p(l). It
addresses Medicare reimbursement for bone-marrow density tests. Id. § 1395w-4(b)(4)(B).
The Act includes many tax provisions as well. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 45R (tax credit, effective in
the 2010 tax year, for small employers providing coverage to their employees). These and
countless other provisions of the Act are entirely capable of being applied even if the
minimum coverage provision were struck down. It is far from “evident” that Congress
would have preferred all of these provisions to be invalidated if the minimum coverage
provision were to fall.9 Indeed, there is no such evidence at all.
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should reach out to strike down the entire statute,
because the Act does not include a severability clause, the absence of which plaintiffs

8

This link establishes that the minimum coverage provision is constitutional, however,
as Congress has the power to enact measures to ensure the vitality of its broader regulations of
interstate commerce. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
9

Contrary to plaintiffs’ baseless assertion, Pls.’ Mem. at 47-48, the government’s
position has been the same in this case as in other cases presenting challenges to 26 U.S.C. §
5000A; the minimum coverage provision stands or falls with the ACA’s guaranteed-issue and
community-rating insurance industry reforms, but the remainder of the Act survives.
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consider to be “instructive.” Pls.’ Mem. at 47. The Supreme Court disagrees: “In the
absence of a severability clause, . . . Congress’s silence is just that—silence—and does not
raise a presumption against severability.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686
(1987).
Plaintiffs also rely on the reasoning of the district court in Florida, which
acknowledged that the vast majority of the ACA can function in the absence of 26 U.S.C §
5000A, but nonetheless invalidated the entire statute because “there is nothing to indicate
that they can do so in the manner intended by Congress.” Florida, 2011 WL 285683, at *34.
But it is not defendants’ burden to prove this point. The burden is instead on plaintiffs to
prove that it is “evident” that Congress would have preferred the rest of the statute (or
particular portions) to be invalidated along with the unconstitutional provisions. Free Enter.
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161-62. The court in Florida reasoned that Congress’s central purpose
was to make insurance coverage more available and more affordable through its insurance
industry reforms, and concluded that Congress would not have wanted other provisions
directed toward the same end (or even to entirely unrelated ends) to survive. The court cited
nothing in the statute or the legislative history to document such an intent. And “[c]ommon
sense suggests that where Congress has enacted a statutory scheme for an obvious purpose,
and where Congress has included a series of provisions operating as incentives to achieve
that purpose, the invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress’
overall intent to be frustrated.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Mere supposition cannot overcome this principle.10

10

Plaintiffs also ask the Court to “enjoin” the defendants from enforcing any provision of
the ACA, but make no effort whatsoever to show their entitlement to injunctive relief. Their
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be
granted, and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be denied.

Defendants

respectfully request the opportunity to present argument in support of their motion.
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